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INTRODUCTION)
A! recent! literature! on! international! economics! has! focused! on! the! effects! of! trade! openness! when!firms!are!heterogeneous!and!multiproduct,!since!the!seminal!work!by !Melitz!(2003) .!A! number! of! oligopolistic! and! monopolistically! competitive! models! have! been! proposed,! and! used! to! assess! the! theoretical! implications! of! operating! in! a! larger! market! and/or! exposing! domestic!firms!to!international!competition! (Neary,!2009 ).!The!same!models!could!be!fruitfully! be!employed!to!explore!other!interesting!issues,!which!may!be!of!less!interest!for!international! economics!but!still!very!relevant!for!other!fields,!like!general!industrial!economics.! ! Oligopolistic!models!for!multiproduct!firms,!for!example!those!introduced!by !Feenstra!and!Ma! (2007 ,!2008 , !Eckel!and!Neary!(2010) , !Luong!(2010) ,!allow!for!the!endogenous!determination! of! the! number! of! product! varieties! offered! by! the! same! firm! (product! scope).! The! optimal! product! scope! is! then! found! where! marginal! profits! of! expanding! scope! are! zero.! Decreasing! returns! to! scope! are! obtained! in ! Eckel! and! Neary! (2010) ! by! assuming! that! firms! possess! a! "core! competence"! in! the! production! of! a! particular! variety,! becoming! less! efficient! as! more! varieties! are! produced.! Luong10! takes! a! different! but! somehow! equivalent! approach,! by! assuming!that!managing!multiple!brands!requires!organizational!and!managerial!skills,!which! are!scarce!resources!subject!to!decreasing!marginal!productivity.! ! By!contrast, !Feenstra!and!Ma!(2007 ,!2008 )!obtain!decreasing!returns!to!scope!by!just!relaxing! the! simplifying! assumption,! usually! adopted! in! most! models! based! on! the! DixitHStiglitz! framework,! of! ignoring! ownHprice! effects! on! the! aggregate! price! index.! Departing! from! this! assumption!may!be!important!when!firms!cover!a!non!negligible!share!of!the!market,!and!this! is!likely!to!be!the!case!when!firms!produce!several!products,!rather!than!just!one.!When!new! products! are! added,! demand! for! all! existing! varieties,! including! those! produced! by! the! same! firm,! decreases.! This! effect,! which! is! sometimes! referred! to! as! "cannibalization",! reduces! the! marginal! benefit! of! expanding! the! product! scope! and,! since! the! cannibalization! effect! is! stronger!when!more!varieties!are!in!place,!this!generates!decreasing!returns!to!scope.! ! The! Feenstra! and! Ma! model! is! sufficiently! general! and! analytically! tractable.! In! this! work,! I! present! the! basic! setting! of! this! model,! with! only! minor! modifications,! with! the! aim! of! exploring! equilibrium! in! the! market! when! firms! have! different! production! costs! and! make! different! choices! about! the! product! scope.! ! I! then! extend! the! basic! model! to! account! for! free! entry!and!monopolistic!competition! ! Understanding!the!strategic!role!played!by!variations!in!the!range!of!offered!products!may!be! especially! important! for! some! markets,! like! those! of! media! services.! Many! differentiated! services! are! provided! on! the! Internet,! where! large! multiproduct! platforms,! like! Google,! may! coexist! with! smaller! providers,! typically! focusing! on! one! type! of! service.! Another! example! is! advertisementHbased!television!broadcasting.!In!Italy!(as!well!as!in!most!European!countries),! this! industry! is! concentrated,! with! three! players! covering! much! of! the! market.! After! the! transition! from! analog! to! digital! broadcasting,! which! allows! for! the! existence! of! many! more! channels!into!the!same!frequency!spectrum,!the!former!StateHowned!monopoly!RAI!expanded! its! supply! from! 3! to! 11! channels.! Private! companies! Mediaset! and! Telecom! Italia! increased! their!number!of!channels!from!3!to!7!and!from!1!to!2,!respectively.!!! ! Theoretical!models!like!the!one!described!in!this!paper!can!provide!a!conceptual!framework!to! better!understand!the!strategic!response!obtained!through!variations!in!the!product!scope.!As! a! key! characteristic! of! many! markets! in! which! multiproduct! firms! compete! is! firms'! heterogeneity,!it!is!also!important!to!explicitly!address!the!issue!of!asymmetric!equilibria.! ! This!is!the!primary!aim!of!the!paper,!which!is!organized!as!follows.!The!next!section!introduces! the!model!and!illustrates!its!structure.!Section!three!is!devoted!to!a!qualitative!analysis!of!an! asymmetric!duopolistic!equilibrium,!which!is!done!through!a!numerical!example.!The!model!is! then!extended!in!section!four,!to!allow!for!free!entry!by!heterogeneous!firms!in!a!monopolistic! competition!setting. (7)!is!taken! into!account:! ! ! !(10)! ! This! result! deserves! some! comment.! The! higher! the! market! share! of! a! firm,! the! lower! the! perceived!elasticity!(7),!the!higher!the!price!is!set!(10).!This!is!because!a!variation!in!the!price! of!a!specific!variety!changes!its!demand!but!also!changes,!in!opposite!way,!the!demand!for!all! 
Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008) derive an optimality condition for the profit maximizing choice of N j . Interestingly, the optimal number of varieties (or "scope") is also a function of a firm market share:
Where f j = dFj /dNj is the cost of adding one more variety. The optimal scope N j is strictly increasing in R, decreasing in f j and ✏. These relationships are all easy to interpret. The relationship between N j and s j , on the other hand, is not a trivial one. Figure 1 plots the optimal N j as a function of the market share 0  s j  1, for arbitrary values of R and f j , and various values of ✏.
The optimal N j is first increasing, then decreasing, reaching a maximum whose position depends on ✏. This is because there are two forces at work. A higher market share reduces the perceived elasticity in (10), thereby determining higher mark-ups per variety. This induces to expand the scope N j . On the other hand, adding one more variety reduces demand for all existing varieties. This effect is stronger when the market share is quite significant and prevails over the previous one for sufficiently large values of s j .
With the addition of (11) it is possible to identify a (short-run) equilibrium in a market of "size" R, where M firms are active.
6 Each firm is characterized by its cost parameters (c j , F j (N j ), h j ), and it is associated with equilibrium conditions (8), (10) and (11). In other words, finding the market equilibrium entails solving a system of 3M equations, for the determination of the endogenous variables 6 An implicit assumption here is that all firms get non negative profits. Ma (2007, 2008) derive an optimality condition for the profit maximizing choice of N j . Interestingly, the optimal number of varieties (or "scope") is also a function of a firm market share:
6 Each firm is characterized by its cost parameters (c j , F j (N j ), h j ), and it is associated with equilibrium conditions Ma (2007, 2008) derive an maximizing choice of N j . Interestingly, the "scope") is also a function of a firm market sh
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An Asymmetric Duopoly
To illustrate the properties of the oligopolistic equilibrium as described in the previous section, and in particular the effect of cost differentials on market asymmetry, let us consider a duopoly with parameters specified as follows: ✏ = 2, R = 10, c 2 = 1, f 2 = 1. If we also set c 1 = 1 and f 1 = 1, we get the symmetric equilibrium with p 1 = p 2 = 3, N 1 = N 2 = 1.67 and, of course, s 1 = s 2 = 0.5. Now, keep f 1 = 1 and analyze how the equilibrium variables change for different values of the marginal cost c 1 of the first firm. Figure 3 shows how the price p 1 , the share s 1 , and the scope N 1 would vary.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 display the effects of varying c 1 on: prices set by the two firms (Figure 3 ), market shares (Figure 4 ) and number of varieties provided by the two firms ( Figure 5 ).
When c 1 increases, prices set by both firms increases because of the direct effect of variable costs (firm 1) and because prices are strategic complements (firm 2). The market shares move symmetrically, and when the marginal cost of the first firm approaches zero, its market share approaches one. The evolution of the variables N j is more complicated. Both N 1 and N 2 are concave functions of c 1 , reaching maxima at N . Consequently, when c 1 is sufficiently smaller or sufficiently larger than c 2 , the number of products put on the market, N 1 and N 2 , move to the same direction, that is, an increase in N 1 is associated with an increase in N 2 , and vice versa. However, for intermediate values of Roson,'R. '(2015) .'Compttition'between'Multiproduct'Firms'with'Heterogeneous'Costs.)Advances)in)Social)Sciences)Research)Journal,)2(7))79B88' observing how the variables of interest change for various values of the marginal scope cost f 1 . Figure 6 is analogous of Figure 3 and shows how the price p 1 , the share s 1 , and the scope N 1 would vary with f 1 . The main effect of a higher set-up cost f 1 is reducing the number of product varieties offered by the first firm. With a lower N 1 , the market share s 1 declines, increasing the perceived demand elasticity, which reduces the price p 1 . This implies an increase in the quantity volumes q 1 , which partly compensates for the fall in market share due to the reduction in product varieties and price. For this reason, the market share s 1 appears to be less sensitive to f 1 than to c 1 .
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the effects of varying f 1 on the corresponding variables (p i , s j , N j ) of the two firms.
The main difference here, with respect to the case of changing c 1 , can be seen in the variation of prices. Whereas with a higher c 1 we noticed that both prices increase (Figure 3) , now a higher f 1 induces a reduction in the price p 1 , but still an increase in the price p 2 . Indeed, in both cases higher costs bring about a reduction in market share s 1 and an increase in s 2 (therefore, in p 2 ). However, whereas c 1 directly affects p 1 , the main impact of f 1 is on N 1 , which is partly compensated through adjustments in the price p 1 .
Monopolistic Competition
We consider now a monopolistic competition setting, with free entry driven by expected profits. Firms are assumed to have different marginal production costs c j but, to simplify, have the same cost sub-function F j (N j ) and no headquarters costs h j . Unlike Ma (2007, 2008) 7 but similarly to Montagna observing how the variables of interes scope cost f 1 . Figure 6 is analogous the share s 1 , and the scope N 1 would The main effect of a higher set-up varieties offered by the first firm. Wit increasing the perceived demand ela implies an increase in the quantity v the fall in market share due to the red this reason, the market share s 1 appe Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the effect ables (p i , s j , N j ) of the two firms.
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We consider now a monopolistic com expected profits. Firms are assumed t c j but, to simplify, have the same cost costs h j . Unlike Feenstra and Ma ( 7 These authors assume the existence of a parameters drawn from a probability distribu ! ! ) ) The!main!difference!here,!with!respect!to!the!case!of!changing!c1,!can!be!seen!in!the!variation!of! prices.!Whereas!with!a!higher!c1!we!noticed!that!both!prices!increase! (Figure!3) ,!now!a!higher! f1!induces!a!reduction!in!the!price!p1,!but!still!an!increase!in!the!price!p2.!Indeed,!in!both!cases! higher!costs!bring!about!a!reduction!in!market!share!s1!and!an!increase!in!s2!(therefore,!in!p2).! However,! whereas! c1! directly! affects! p1,! the! main! impact! of! f1! is! on! N1,! which! is! partly! compensated!through!adjustments!in!the!price!p1.' ! Monopolistic)Competition) We! consider! now! a! monopolistic! competition! setting,! with! free! entry! driven! by! expected! profits.!Firms!are!assumed!to!have!different!marginal!production!costs!cj!but,!to!simplify,!have! the!same!cost!subHfunction!Fj(Nj)!and!no!headquarters!costs!hj.!Unlike !Feenstra!and!Ma!(2007 ,! 2008 3 !but! similarly! to! Montagna! (1995)! we! assume! that! firms! are! continuously! distributed! over!a!cost!range,!so!that!G(c)!expresses!the!density!of!firms!having!marginal!production!cost!c.!! ! When! the! optimal! product! scope! Nj! is! chosen! (see! (11) 
Conclusions
Multiproduct firms are not ju market conditions change, fir volume, quality, etc., but also latter effect is especially impo tions and media, in particular ature on multiproduct firms a scope choice has been studie Judd (1985) ) or as a response mination of market structure has not been directly address Fortunately, some new m nomics have the potential to model by Feenstra and Ma (2 dress the issue of asymmetry differences in strategic respon firms are multidimensional, a or to the addition of a new p may differ in all these dimens a different asymmetric marke
